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TRUMP, GENDER REBELS, AND MASCULINITIES 
Dara E. Purvis* 
Since the inauguration of President Trump, most of his 
Administration’s actions have been sharply conservative: 
notably, his efforts to ban transgender Americans from 
military service.  There have been exceptions, however, such 
as proposals to create support for paid parental leave, an 
issue previously championed by Democrats. 
This seeming contradiction of progressive and regressive 
policies can be reconciled by viewing the Trump 
Administration through the lens of masculinities theory. 
Hegemonic masculinity depends upon sharp differentiation 
between “real” men and everyone else, the latter occupying 
places in a hierarchy far below men.  In this reading, Trump’s 
version of parental support makes sense: it focuses support 
solely on women, who in the view of hegemonic masculinity 
are the only proper caregivers for children.  Similarly, 
masculinities analysis helps to explain targeting transgender 
Americans, as this group directly challenges a central tenet of 
hegemonic masculinity—that gender is binary and 
immutable. 
Masculinities thus explains arguably contradictory 
policies and reveals that both policies reflect the Trump 
Administration’s hostility to principles of diversity and 
antidiscrimination.  The Administration is not against 
antidiscrimination in all forms—only those that challenge 
the hegemonic ideals of masculinities. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On the campaign trail in the fall of 2016, the Trump campaign 
proposed a plan of six weeks’ paid parental leave for new mothers.1  
Although most Americans support paid family leave (at least in the 
abstract),2 the proposal broke with previous opposition to state—
sponsored paid leave by the Republican Party.3  Indeed, as the 
election date approached, support for paid family leave was a rare 
point of agreement between the Trump and Clinton campaigns.4 
After Donald Trump’s election, his daughter Ivanka Trump 
chaired a working group to discuss paid leave, and a paid leave 
proposal was included in the initial budget proposal in the summer of 
2017.5  The comparatively progressive support for what had 
historically been a feminist issue stood in stark contrast to Trump’s 
extremely conservative actions in other spheres, such as his July 2017 
tweets announcing that transgender soldiers would no longer be 
permitted to serve in the US military.6 
The Trump Administration’s contrasting treatment of working 
mothers and transgender servicemembers creates a puzzle: how to 
reconcile policy proposals seemingly pointed at opposite ideological 
ends.  One reading of this contrast is a failure of intersectionalism.  
Having divided the electorate in November 2016, President Trump 
and his Administration gave some support to policies supported by 
 
 1. See Rebecca A. Brusca, A Comprehensive Analysis of the Effects of Paid 
Parental Leave in the U.S., 19 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 75, 91–92 (2017); Trina Jones, A 
Different Class of Care: The Benefits Crisis and Low-Wage Workers, 66 AM. U. L. 
REV. 691, 754 (2017). 
 2. See Rosalind Dixon & Julie Suk, Liberal Constitutionalism and 
Economic Inequality, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 369, 375 (2018). 
 3. See Brusca, supra note 1. 
 4. See Megan A. Sholar, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton Both Support 




 5. Danielle Paquette & Damian Paletta, U.S. Could Get First Paid Family 
Leave Benefit Under Trump Budget Proposal, WASH. POST (May 18, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/05/18/u-s-could-get-first-
paid-family-leave-benefit-under-trump-plan. 
 6. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 5:55 
AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890193981585444864; Donald 
J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 6:04 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890196164313833472. 
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Republican white women while targeting and further isolating 
transgender people.7 
Another reading, however, is that Trump’s Administration is a 
textbook example of masculinities theory put into practice.  
Masculinities depends upon identifying what is appropriately 
masculine as well as other-izing all other traits perceived as feminine 
or homosexual.8  There is a place in masculinities for the feminine, 
but it must be assigned to females and clearly delineated from the 
masculine ideal.9  There is no place, however, for people who 
challenge the concept of gender as binary and unchangeable.10  For 
this reason, it is entirely consistent for an administration embodying 
concepts of masculinities to provide support for feminine roles such 
as caregiving, but only when caregiving is properly identified as 
female and appropriately distinguished from masculine activities.  
This helps to explain the Trump Administration’s family leave 
proposal, which would make paid parental leave dependent upon the 
recipient withdrawing funds from their Social Security benefits and 
thus retiring later.11  Support for caregiving is explicitly structured 
as a tradeoff between work and childcare, sending the unmistakable 
message that the two worlds are incompatible and reinforcing the 
historic notion of separate spheres for men and women.12  The 
Administration can thus give salutary support to women while 
underscoring profoundly antifeminist principles. 
By contrast, there is no way to reconcile acceptance of 
transgender people with masculinities: they directly challenge the 
principles of difference upon which masculinities is based.13  This 
helps to explain the full-frontal assault upon any legal protections of 
transgender people, including the Department of Education’s 
withdrawal of guidance clarifying that Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972’s (“Title IX”) prohibition of sex discrimination 
 
 7. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
 8. See Nancy E. Dowd, Asking the Man Question: Masculinities Analysis 
and Feminist Theory, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 415, 418 (2010); John M. Kang, 
The Burdens of Manliness, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 477, 478 (2010). 
 9. See David S. Cohen, Keeping Men “Men” and Women Down: Sex 
Segregation, Anti-Essentialism, and Masculinity, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 509, 
528 (2010) (discussing how men determine what behaviors are acceptably 
masculine). 
 10. See Janine M. deManda, Comment, Our Transgressions: The Legal 
System’s Struggle with Providing Equal Protection to Transgender and 
Transsexual People, 71 UMKC L. REV. 507, 508 (2002). 
 11. See Elizabeth Bruenig, Opinion, Trump’s Paid Family Leave Plan Would 




 12. See Gwynn Guilford, Trump’s Maternity Leave Plan Is a Joke on Parents 
of All Genders, QUARTZ (Sept. 18, 2016), https://qz.com/783303/trumps-child-care-
plan-will-put-women-even-farther-behind-in-pay-and-career-advancement/. 
 13. See deManda, supra note 10. 
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also prohibits discrimination against transgender students,14 the 
Department of Justice’s reversal of its position regarding the 
applicability of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s (“Title VII”) 
prohibition of sex discrimination to transgender employees,15 and 
Trump’s tweets purporting to ban transgender servicemembers.16 
Recognizing how completely the Trump Administration furthers 
principles of masculinities deepens our understanding of how and 
why the Administration is hostile to principles of diversity and 
antidiscrimination.  The Administration is not against 
antidiscrimination in all forms—only those that challenge the 
hegemonic ideals of masculinities.  This opens some narrow windows 
to restraining some of the Trump Administration’s attacks upon 
diversity and exposes more clearly the animus underlying other 
efforts. 
II.  CROSSED POLICIES: FAMILY LEAVE AND TRANSGENDER MILITARY 
SERVICE 
A. Family Leave 
Alone among industrialized nations, the United States does not 
have a nationwide policy or requirement providing paid parental 
leave.17  The sole federal statute regarding family leave is the Family 
and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), which provides only unpaid leave.18  
The FMLA is capped at twelve weeks of such unpaid leave per year 
and does not apply to all employers.19  Only about half of American 
workers are covered by the FMLA’s mandate,20 and the majority of 
those employees generally cannot afford to take unpaid time off.21 
 
 14. See Sandra Battle & T.E. Wheeler, II, Dear Colleague Letter, U.S. DEP’T 
JUST. & U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list 
/ocr/letters/colleague-201702-title-ix.pdf; Catherine E. Lhamon & Vanita Gupta, 
Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students, U.S. DEP’T JUST. & U.S. DEP’T 
EDUC. (May 13, 2016), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-
201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf. 
 15. See Jeff Sessions, Memorandum on Revised Treatment of Transgender 
Employment Discrimination Claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file 
/1006981/download. 
 16. Sam Levin, White House Announces Ban on Transgender People Serving 
in Military, GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2018, 8:41 AM), https://www.theguardian.com 
/us-news/2018/mar/23/donald-trump-transgender-military-ban-white-house-
memo. 
 17. See Brusca, supra note 1, at 76. 
 18. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(c) (2018) 
(requiring only unpaid leave). 
 19. See Nancy E. Dowd, Fatherhood and Equality: Reconfiguring 
Masculinities, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1047, 1068 (2012). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Maxine Eichner, Families, Human Dignity, and State Support for 
Caretaking: Why the United States’ Failure to Ameliorate the Work-Family 
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In the absence of state-mandated leave policies, it is up to 
individual employers to decide whether to offer any family leave to 
their employees.22  Some private companies voluntarily choose to 
provide their employees with paid parental leave, although a recent 
study found that only twelve percent of private sector employees had 
any paid leave through such employer-generated plans.23  Paid leave 
is thus available only to a small minority of employees; unpaid leave 
is available but unrealistic for a significant number, and the 
remainder of American workers have no leave at all. 
This lack of leave options seems to assume that employees simply 
do not have caregiving responsibilities that might interfere with their 
ability to come to work.24  This is a very different approach than other 
countries that increased the availability of leave as families moved 
further and further away from a breadwinner/homemaker model, in 
which an employer might more reasonably expect the breadwinner to 
be free of any caregiving responsibilities, towards families more 
typically headed by two earners.25 
The Trump campaign proposal to provide six weeks of paid leave 
would thus have been a significant change, although it was unclear 
from the start how broadly the proposed leave would be made 
available.26  Initial statements on the Trump campaign website and 
explanations provided by Ivanka Trump in 2017 indicated that the 
leave would be available only to married mothers, excluding 
unmarried mothers, fathers, and adoptive parents.27  Later 
discussions of the plan suggested that all three of the excluded 
categories might be included after all,28 and in 2018 Senator Marco 
Rubio sponsored the Economic Security for New Parents Act, a more 
 
Conflict Is a Dereliction of the Government’s Basic Responsibilities, 88 N.C. L. 
REV. 1593, 1604 (2010). 
 22. See generally NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, Paid Family Leave 
Resources (Jan. 10, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment 
/paid-family-leave-resources.aspx (noting that only four states currently mandate 
paid family leave). 
 23. See Brusca, supra note 1, at 76. 
 24. See Arianne Renan Barzilay, Power in the Age of In/Equality: Economic 
Abuse, Masculinities, and the Long Road to Marriage Equality, 51 AKRON L. REV. 
323, 338 (2017). 
 25. See Eichner, supra note 21, at 1595. 
 26. See, e.g., Michelle Goldberg, Donald Trump’s Family Policy Is Terrible: 
It’s also Great News for American Families, SLATE (Sept. 14, 2016, 1:04 PM), 
https://slate.com/human-interest/2016/09/donald-trumps-terrible-family-
policy.html. 
 27. See Danielle Paquette, Donald Trump’s New Paid Maternity Leave Plan 
Might Exclude Single Mothers, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/09/20/donald-trumps-
new-paid-maternity-leave-plan-might-exclude-single-mothers; see also Sarah E. 
Crippen et al., What L&E Attorneys Need to Know About the Trump 
Administration, FED. LAW., July 2017, at 46, 47. 
 28. Seth K. Kornfeld, A Need Not Being Met: Providing Paid Family and 
Medical Leave for All Americans, 56 FAM. CT. REV. 165, 169 (2018). 
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specific proposal supported by Ivanka Trump.29  This plan provided 
paid leave by allowing new parents to pull money from their own 
Social Security benefits—so the paid leave would, many years down 
the line, delay the retirement of any parent who used it.30  Rubio’s bill 
was referred to the Committee on Finance in August 2018, and, given 
the change in leadership in the House of Representatives after the 
2018 midterm elections, it seems unlikely that the plan will become 
law in the future.31  That said, prominent Republicans discussing and 
supporting any form of paid family leave took an issue that had 
previously been one associated entirely with the Democratic Party32 
and claimed, in a high-profile way, that it would be a concern of the 
Trump Administration.33 
B. Transgender Military Service 
During the campaign, Trump made a variety of conflicting 
statements about his stances on LGBTQ-related issues but at least 
claimed (albeit without any evidence) that he would be better for the 
LGBTQ community than Hillary Clinton.34  After his inauguration, 
however, Trump took a variety of strongly anti-LGBTQ positions, 
most dramatically a public reversal on the inclusion of transgender 
servicemembers in the military.35  Under President Barack Obama, 
the Department of Defense issued a set of regulations specifying that 
transgender people were eligible for military service and that 
transgender servicemembers could receive appropriate medical 
treatment at the cost of the government, including gender 
confirmation surgery if they so desired.36 
In July 2017, however, Trump tweeted in the early morning 
hours, “After consultation with my Generals and military experts, 
please be advised that the United States Government will not accept 
 
 29. See Bruenig, supra note 11. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See generally Sarah Binder, Here Are 4 Things to Expect from a New, 
Trumpier, More Polarized Congress, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/11/07/here-are-4-
things-to-expect-from-a-new-trumpier-more-polarized-congress/?noredirect=on 
&utm_term=.cb7d35cbd11b (noting that Republican and Democratic lawmakers 
will be unlikely to cross party lines to pass legislation in the split-party 
Congress). 
 32. Naomi Jagoda, Rubio Rolls Out Paid Parental Leave Bill, HILL (Aug. 2, 
2018, 4:34 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/400147-rubio-rolls-out-paid-
parental-leave-bill. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Kayla Epstein, Trump’s Stance on LGBT Rights Has Always Been 
Confusing, WASH. POST (July 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/the-fix/wp/2017/07/26/trumps-stance-on-lgbt-rights-has-always-been-confusing. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Peter Grieser, Administrative Contexts of Access to Gender-Confirmation 
Surgery, 27 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 165, 180–81 (2018). 
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or allow . . .”37 “[t]ransgender individuals to serve in any capacity in 
the U.S. Military.  Our military must be focused on decisive and 
overwhelming . . .”38 “victory and cannot be burdened with the 
tremendous medical costs and disruption that transgender in the 
military would entail.  Thank you[.]”39  Initial reaction to the tweets 
was partly one of confusion, as it was not immediately clear what the 
legal significance of tweets from the Commander-in-Chief were, and 
his statements left many questions of implementation open.40 
The following month, Trump clarified at least some of the 
questions in a memorandum.41  His memo indefinitely extended a 
temporary prohibition against transgender people enlisting into the 
military, required that the military discharge transgender 
servicemembers by late March 2018, and prohibited military health 
insurance or military doctors from providing gender confirmation 
surgery.42  In February 2018, the Department of Defense issued a 
report largely replicating the memo’s policies.43 
Legal advocacy groups immediately sued the Trump 
Administration seeking to enjoin application of the new policies and 
won a number of early victories, although the cases remain ongoing 
as this Article goes to print.44  Just as in the case of paid family leave, 
the Trump Administration took a strong public stance on a potentially 
divisive issue, even though actual implementation of that stance 
remains unclear. 
III.  MASCULINITIES 
Masculinities studies initially developed among sociologists, 
although the field draws upon a number of wide-ranging subjects and 
has been applied far beyond sociological analysis.45  The basic idea is 
relatively simple: how does society define what is masculine?46  
Notably, the inquiry is described as a question of masculinities rather 
 
 37. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 5:55 
AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890193981585444864. 
 38. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 6:04 
AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890196164313833472. 
 39. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 6:08 
AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890197095151546369. 
 40. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Presidential Exit, 67 DUKE L.J. 1729, 
1759–60 (2018). 
 41. Memorandum on Military Service by Transgender Individuals, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 41,319 (Aug. 25, 2017). 
 42. See Anthony S. Winer, Action and Reaction: The Trump Executive Orders 
and Their Reception by the Federal Courts, 44 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 907, 
915–16 (2018). 
 43. Id. at 916–17. 
 44. See id. at 928–29. 
 45. Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. Destefano: A Masculinities Theory Analysis, 33 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 581, 585 (2010). 
 46. Id. (explaining that the study of masculinity was developed to 
understand men and define their masculinity). 
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than masculinity, to make explicit that there is no single essentialist 
definition of masculinity.47  Instead, multiple conceptions of 
masculinities operate amidst other hierarchies such as class and 
race.48  A fuller understanding of the different aspects of 
masculinities thus illuminates not just the oppression of other 
genders by men but also the oppression of some groups of men by 
other men.49 
In the hierarchy of masculinities, hegemonic masculinity is at the 
top of the rankings.50  Scholars have traced some basic principles of 
hegemonic masculinity, often as a process of exclusion.51  For 
example, the two central principles of hegemonic masculinity are 
admonishments about what not to be: don’t be a woman, and don’t be 
gay.52  Thus, hegemonic masculinity obviously sets masculinity above 
women and LGBTQ people but also allows for criticism of men if those 
men do not perfectly conform to the dictates of hegemonic 
masculinity.53  Such men are inferior as inadequately masculine.54 
Notably, these strictures of hegemonic masculinity are not 
internal states of being.  Nor does a single achievement of hegemonic 
masculinity secure someone’s status as a hegemonic man in 
perpetuity.55  Instead, masculinity is constructed through external 
performances.56  Such performances must constantly be executed and 
re-executed.  As Keith Cunningham-Parmeter described it, 
Because hegemonic masculinity gives rise to ongoing 
competitions, men feel the urge to constantly prove their 
manhood to other men.  This daily monitoring among men gives 
rise to a great deal of anxiety as men always fear that their lack 
of masculinity will be discovered.  Thus, although men as a 
whole remain socially dominant, individual men experience 
 
 47. Richard Collier, Masculinities, Law, and Personal Life: Towards A New 
Framework for Understanding Men, Law, and Gender, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 
431, 441 (2010). 
 48. See Dowd, supra note 8. 
 49. Id. at 419–20. 
 50. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Men at Work, Fathers at Home: 
Uncovering the Masculine Face of Caregiver Discrimination, 24 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 253, 272 (2013). 
 51. See, e.g., id. at 273; Dowd, supra note 8. 
 52. See Dowd, supra note 8; Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: 
Fear, Shame and Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity, in FEMINISM & 
MASCULINITIES 182, 185 (Peter F. Murphy ed., 2004); McGinley, supra note 45, at 
586. 
 53. Cohen, supra note 9, at 523. 
 54. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 50, at 273. 
 55. Nancy E. Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 WIS. J.L. 
GENDER & SOC’Y 201, 229 (2008) (“It is also a core insight of masculinity that men 
experience manhood as something constantly to be achieved, not something 
simply attained and lived.”). 
 56. See Barzilay, supra note 24, at 347–48; McGinley, supra note 45, at 586. 
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feelings of shame, fear, and emotional isolation due to this 
unending process of proof.57 
As Nancy Dowd summarized, even though masculinity is the 
dominant ideology oppressing nonmale people, masculinity is “to a 
large degree about fear and shame and emotional isolation.”58  The 
constantly shifting status of one’s masculinity means that one must 
constantly reperform one’s manhood, demonstrating how one is not 
feminine and is not homosexual, lest other men believe that one’s 
conformity with the ideals of hegemonic masculinity is slipping.59 
A. Masculinities and Parental Leave 
Taking masculinities into account, the view of the Trump 
Administration’s support for paid parental leave shifts considerably.  
One reading is a progressive view: paid parental leave enables women 
to stay in the workforce; thus, support for paid parental leave is a 
feminist act supporting women’s choices to take on roles they were 
previously denied.60  This is certainly the focus of legislative debate 
around paid parental leave.  It is also descriptively true that paid 
parental leave has measurable results facilitating women’s paid work 
outside of the home: one study found that women who took paid leave 
were six percent more likely to still be employed full-time one year 
later.61 
An alternative reading, however, points out how the Trump plan 
reinforces traditional gender norms that place primary responsibility 
for caregiving (especially of infants) upon women.62  Arlie Hochschild 
and Anne Machung famously coined the term “second shift” to 
summarize the idea that women are free to add paid employment 
alongside their duties at home, but not to replace one with the other.63  
After a full day of employment outside of the home, in other words, 
women come home to start their second shift of caregiving and 
homemaking duties. 
As outlined above, one of the central guiding rules of hegemonic 
masculinity is not to be a woman.64  This means that a “true” man 
does not take on any womanly roles or duties, and chief among those 
 
 57. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 50, at 273–74. 
 58. Dowd, supra note 55, at 213. 
 59. McGinley, supra note 45, at 586. 
 60. Jennifer E. Karr, Where’s My Dad? A Feminist Approach to Incentivized 
Paternity Leave, 28 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 225, 229–30 (2017). 
 61. Brusca, supra note 1, at 85–86. 
 62. Id. at 92. 
 63. See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING 
FAMILIES AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989) (describing the guilt felt by 
mothers who sacrificed domestic responsibilities for paid employment). 
 64. See supra notes 45–59 and accompanying text. 
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is caregiving responsibilities.65  Hegemonic masculinity thus 
demands a model where a man is the breadwinner, providing 
financially for his children, and a woman is the one who actually 
provides care for the children.66  A man providing care directly to his 
children would be seen as engaged in “gender betrayal,” and 
absolutely violating the rules of hegemonic masculinity.67 
This understanding plays out in existing patterns of whether 
men and women take any parental leave.68  Women are far more 
likely to take leave, even where it is available to employees of any 
gender.69  There are scores of examples of employers who punish male 
employees for taking on caregiving responsibilities.70  Whether 
because of concrete reactions from unsympathetic employers or 
internalized norms of masculinity, even men who take parental leave 
take an extremely small amount of leave, generally one week or less.71  
Such a short period of time indicates that the leave is not devoted to 
a new infant, but to assisting a man’s female partner as she deals 
with the immediate recovery of childbirth or a cesarean section 
delivery.  Caregiving leave is made available to women, both literally 
because there is typically more parental leave offered to women and 
because a female employee taking parental leave is less often frowned 
upon by her employer.72  A female employee taking parental leave in 
order to become a mother is following the rules of masculinity by 
operating in a purely feminine role.73 
A man taking on caregiving work, however, is breaking the rules 
of hegemonic masculinity.74  This can present a particularly difficult 
 
 65.  Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, Dirty Harry Meets Dirty Diapers: 
Masculinities, At-Home Fathers, and Making the Law Work for Families, 22 TEX. 
J. WOMEN & L. 1, 11 (2012). 
 66. Id. at 10–11; see also Laura T. Kessler, The Politics of Care, 23 WIS. J.L. 
GENDER & SOC’Y 169, 170 (2008) (arguing that “when practiced by individuals 
whom the state has historically denied the privilege of family privacy, caregiving 
work may constitute a positive political practice of resistance to oppression”). 
 67. Dowd, supra note 19, at 1057–58. 
 68. It is worth noting that many employees of all genders face discrimination 
from their employer if they have any family caregiving responsibilities.  The 
Center for WorkLife Law, based at UC Hastings College of the Law, has a major 
initiative centered on Family Responsibilities Discrimination, including 
comprehensive reports about litigation challenging such discrimination.  See, e.g., 
Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Caregivers in the Workplace: Family Responsibilities 
Discrimination Litigation Update 2016, WORKLIFE LAW, https://worklifelaw.org 
/publications/Caregivers-in-the-Workplace-FRD-update-2016.pdf. 
 69. Noya Rimalt, The Maternal Dilemma, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 977, 999 
(2018). 
 70. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 50, at 257; see also Karr, supra note 
60, at 235–36. 
 71. Brusca, supra note 1, at 86. 
 72. Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of 
Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1073–74 (1996). 
 73. Naomi R. Cahn, Gendered Identities: Women and Household Work, 44 
VILL. L. REV. 525, 530 (1999). 
 74. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 50, at 259. 
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dilemma if a man’s masculinity is threatened by circumstances not 
entirely within his control.  If a husband earns less money than his 
wife, for example, one study found that the husband is less likely to 
help out with any work around the house.75  Because his masculinity 
is threatened by his wife usurping his breadwinner role, he is more 
likely to reject and refuse to participate in the “feminine” activities of 
housework.76 
Similarly, Beth Burkstrand-Reid found that men who became 
full-time caregiving fathers due to their inability to find full-time paid 
employment often increased their performances of masculine 
behaviors in order to reassert their masculinity.77  Such caregiving 
men “may compensate for their socially constructed ‘feminine’ actions 
by engaging in other, traditionally masculine activities.”78  One 
particularly colorful example is a fathers’ group that held their 
meetings at a shooting range.79  This is certainly not limited to men 
pushed into caregiving work: Angela Harris has previously written 
about similar behaviors in the context of race, in which lower-status 
groups of men similarly engage in hypermasculine activities to 
reassert status.80 
1. Masculinities and Legal Gender 
The dynamics of masculinities and parental caregiving have 
played out in the courts as well as in society.  Although gender 
equality is certainly not yet achieved, there have been notable 
examples of success in the courts identifying the dangers (and 
illegality) of punishing women for transgressing gender stereotypes.  
There has been less movement, however, to protect men who 
transgress gender stereotypes, particularly in the context of 
caregiving.  A few examples demonstrate the problem. 
One of the most famous cases involving women and gender 
stereotypes is Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,81 a landmark Supreme 
Court case from 1989.82  The plaintiff was Ann Hopkins, who worked 
at Price Waterhouse as a senior manager.83  In 1982, she was 
proposed as a candidate for partnership, the only candidate (of eighty-
eight total) who was female.84  As part of the consideration process, 
existing partners could submit written evaluations of Hopkins’ 
 
 75. Cahn, supra note 73, at 535. 
 76. Id. at 535–36. 
 77. See Burkstrand-Reid, supra note 65, at 2. 
 78. Id. at 15; see also Dowd, supra note 19, at 1063–64. 
 79. See Dara E. Purvis, The Sexual Orientation of Fatherhood, 2013 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 983, 996 (2013). 
 80. Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. 
L. REV. 777, 785 (2000). 
 81. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 231. 
 84. Id. at 231–33. 
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performance.85  Much of her feedback was positive, evaluating her 
performance at the firm highly.86  She was also the subject, however, 
of criticism regarding her interpersonal skills, describing her as 
“sometimes overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with 
and impatient with staff.”87 
Poor interpersonal skills or difficulty as a colleague might 
obviously be a potential roadblock in the way of any employee’s 
potential promotion.  In Hopkins’ case, however, significant amounts 
of the feedback tied her perceived shortcomings in interpersonal 
relationships to her failure to conform to gender stereotypes and act 
appropriately feminine.88  Partners criticized her as “macho,” 
suggested that she undergo “a course at charm school,” and criticized 
her use of profanity because, as another partner put it, “it’s a lady 
using foul language.”89  Hopkins was not approved for promotion to 
partner, and the explanation given for what Hopkins could do to 
improve her candidacy in the future was that she should “walk more 
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear 
make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”90 
Hopkins sued under Title VII, which prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of sex.91  The question before the Supreme Court was not 
whether some of Price Waterhouse’s partners had expressed sexist 
views in their evaluations of Hopkins but what the burden of proof 
was to find that the discrimination had risen to the level that it 
violated Title VII, and upon whom that burden of proof fell.92  Price 
Waterhouse, predictably, argued that the burden was Hopkins’ to 
overcome, by demonstrating that had the sexism not been present in 
her evaluations, Price Waterhouse would have granted her 
partnership.93 
The Supreme Court disagreed, citing “Congress’ intent to forbid 
employers to take gender into account in making employment 
decisions.”94  The Court held instead: 
[O]nce a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that gender played a 
motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may 
avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it would have 
made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play 
such a role.95 
 
 85. Id. at 232. 
 86. Id. at 233–34. 
 87. Id. at 234–35. 
 88. Id. at 235. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 232. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 237–38. 
 94. Id. at 239. 
 95. Id. 244–45. 
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In other words, in order to show that Price Waterhouse violated Title 
VII, Hopkins first had to show that her gender played a motivating 
part in Price Waterhouse’s decision not to promote her to partner.  
Once she demonstrated that, Price Waterhouse would be found to 
have violated Title VII unless it could show that even without the 
sexism in Hopkins’ evaluations, she would not have been promoted.96 
This discussion of how to establish a Title VII violation was one 
of the key holdings of the case, but the real significance for purposes 
of masculinities and gender has to do with what it means to show that 
gender played a motivating part in a given decision.  The most 
simplistic reading of gender in this context might mean a belief about 
all women: for example, that women belong at home instead of at 
work or that women categorically lack the capabilities needed for a 
given job.  That clearly was not the perceived problem with Hopkins—
Price Waterhouse had a poor record in terms of female partnership, 
with only seven female partners of 662 total.97  Seven out of 662 is a 
paltry number but at least demonstrates that Price Waterhouse did 
not literally bar all women from partnership. 
Instead, the problem was that Hopkins was the wrong “kind” of 
woman—she demonstrated traits that were not seen as feminine.98  
The Court identified the problem with this type of stereotype and why 
it was also prohibited by Title VII: “An employer who objects to 
aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places 
women in an intolerable and impermissible catch twenty-two: out of 
a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not.”99  In 
one of the most memorable passages, the Court concisely summarized 
how clearly Price Waterhouse’s stereotyping operated: 
It takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping in a 
description of an aggressive female employee as requiring “a 
course at charm school.”  Nor, turning to Thomas Beyer’s 
memorable advice to Hopkins, does it require expertise in 
psychology to know that, if an employee’s flawed “interpersonal 
skills” can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of 
lipstick, perhaps it is the employee’s sex and not her 
interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism.100 
One of the key impacts of Price Waterhouse was to make clear that 
adverse employment actions taken against a person who does not 
conform to gender stereotypes constitute gender discrimination.101  
This at least opens the door to using antidiscrimination laws such as 
Title VII to work against hegemonic masculinity’s demands that men 
 
 96. Id. at 242. 
 97. Id. at 233. 
 98. Id. at 235–36. 
 99. Id. at 251. 
 100. Id. at 256. 
 101. See id. at 258. 
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be one certain kind of man and that other genders be viewed as 
different and inferior. 
There is mixed legal treatment of how effective 
antidiscrimination protections have been when used to challenge 
hegemonic masculinity directly, particularly in core areas of 
hegemonic masculinity’s mandates such as caregiving.102 
One negative example occurred in 1995.  Gregory McGarity was 
employed by Mary Kay Cosmetics as a Central Weigh Technician.103  
McGarity’s wife was pregnant and due to give birth to their third child 
that fall, so McGarity informed Mary Kay that he would be taking 
FMLA leave when his wife delivered their child.104  His supervisor 
complained that men should not take such leave after their partner 
gave birth, but McGarity’s leave request was approved by Human 
Resources and he took three weeks off of work in October and 
November.105 
After McGarity returned to work, he alleged that his supervisor 
began repeatedly targeting McGarity with poor evaluations and 
disciplinary violations, such as “accusations of workplace errors, 
inaccurate complaints that McGarity was not doing his job, directed 
to [his boss’] supervisor, and miscalculations of McGarity’s efficiency 
ratings upon which he was judged,” as well as a three-day suspension 
for a mistake involving his failure to correctly verify measurements 
taken by an employee under McGarity’s supervision.106  McGarity 
complained to Human Resources, quit his employment with Mary 
Kay, and later filed a complaint with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission.107 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Texas, in assessing his claims against a motion for summary 
judgment, found that McGarity had established the first three (of 
four) elements of a gender discrimination claim under Title VII: he 
was a member of a protected class, was qualified for his job, and had 
suffered an adverse employment action.108  The court found, however, 
that McGarity could not prove the fourth element, which the court 
articulated as “similarly situated members of the opposite sex 
received more favorable treatment because of gender, or his position 
was filled with someone of the opposite sex.”109  The court explained 
that because McGarity could not provide an example of a woman who 
took FMLA leave, made a mistake equivalent to McGarity’s, and did 
 
 102. See Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-
Family Conflicts of Men, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1297, 1316–25 (2012). 
 103. McGarity v. Mary Kay Cosmetics, No. 3:96-CV-3413-R, 1998 WL 50460, 
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 1998). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at *3. 
 109. Id. 
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not suffer any adverse consequences such as suspension, McGarity’s 
claim must fail: 
Plaintiff can not, however, satisfy the fourth element of a prima 
facie case of gender discrimination.  McGarity has not offered 
any evidence to show that similarly situated females were 
treated differently for similar behavior.  Defendant, on the other 
hand, presented evidence that women in the company had taken 
FMLA leave and had not been treated any differently on 
return.110 
As Stephanie Bornstein points out, however, Title VII does not 
require a plaintiff to provide evidence of a similarly situated person 
of a different gender.111  A plaintiff must show that the adverse 
employment action occurred in circumstances that would give rise to 
an inference of discrimination, and pointing to a clear comparator 
fellow employee is a very strong method of creating that inference.112  
McGarity’s case was decided as a motion for summary judgment, 
meaning that as long as some evidentiary support existed for the 
claim, the motion should have been denied.113  McGarity presented 
evidence that his supervisor had said that men should not take 
parental leave and even that he would “get” McGarity when McGarity 
returned to work after his leave finished.114  Despite such statements, 
the court found that the evidence did not justify an inference of 
discrimination.115 
Since the McGarity case, the Supreme Court considered Nevada 
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,116 which spoke directly to 
stereotypes about male caregiving parents.117  The actual holding of 
the case did not speak directly to discrimination against caregiving 
fathers but instead discussed whether state employees could sue a 
state for monetary damages if the state failed to comply with the 
FMLA’s requirements.118  Such monetary damages were only 
available if Congress had abrogated state immunity under its power 
through the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce equal protection of the 
laws.119 
It was important, therefore, to identify the antidiscrimination 
work performed by the FMLA, which, as the Court put it, was 
“protect[ing] the right to be free from gender-based discrimination in 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Bornstein, supra note 102, at 1338. 
 112. Id. 
 113. McGarity, 1998 WL 50460, at *1. 
 114. Id. at *5. 
 115. Id. 
 116. 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 117. Id. at 725. 
 118. Id. at 724–25. 
 119. Id. at 727. 
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the workplace.”120  In explaining how the FMLA protected this right, 
the Court explicitly addressed stereotypes about societal assumptions 
assigning caregiving roles to women rather than men.121  These 
stereotypes, the Court wrote, and associated “differential leave 
policies were not attributable to any differential physical needs of 
men and women but rather to the pervasive sex-role stereotype that 
caring for family members is women’s work.”122  The Court’s focus was 
primarily on the effect such stereotypes have on women, summarizing 
that “Congress sought to ensure that family-care leave would no 
longer be stigmatized as an inordinate drain on the workplace caused 
by female employees, and that employers could not evade leave 
obligations simply by hiring men,”123 rather than a more 
gender-neutral explanation of the harm of stereotypes.  That said, the 
Court’s decision identifies patterns of caregiving as the kind of 
harmful stereotype that constitutes sex discrimination. 
Stephanie Bornstein has argued that targeting discrimination on 
the basis of nonconformity with gender stereotypes,  including a focus 
on the strand of stereotyping fathers who take on caregiving work, 
has promise as a broader strategy in the struggle for equality.124  She 
acknowledges, however, the deep-seated nature of such stereotypes, 
and the seven years since her argument’s publication have not yielded 
any clear victories in court vindicating such an approach.125  
Hegemonic masculinity has thus been implicated in gender 
stereotyping discrimination claims, but it has not yet been 
ameliorated through litigation. 
Viewed against this background, the initial Trump proposal 
providing paid parental leave only to women is not a feminist or 
progressive move at all: it reifies caregiving as women’s work.  
Parental leave effectuated only as maternity leave underscores the 
gender hierarchy very literally, treating employment as a status that 
only men can possess unencumbered.126  Although the later Rubio 
proposal at least made leave available to any gender, it financially 
punished parents for taking leave by funding it from their own 
retirement benefits.127  This would simply replicate existing 
calculations in which parents decide whether they can afford to take 
any unpaid time off.128  Given the precarious economic position of 
most American families, it is natural to assume only one parent will 
take any time off, and as long as the child is the result of pregnancy, 
 
 120. Id. at 728. 
 121. Id. at 730. 
 122. Id. at 731. 
 123. Id. at 737. 
 124. See Bornstein, supra note 102, at 1333, 1344. 
 125. See id. at 1336–42 (surveying cases in which plaintiffs have alleged 
gender stereotyping related to caregiving). 
 126. See Cohen, supra note 9, at 524–25. 
 127. See Bruenig, supra note 11. 
 128. See id. 
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that parent will almost always be female.129  The Rubio/Trump plans 
thus mask their true effect: taking money away from women’s 
retirement.130  It is increasingly clear that one of the chief causes 
behind economic inequality between men and women is the effect of 
childcare responsibilities on women’s earnings.131  The Rubio/Trump 
plans would exacerbate this, making paid leave today dependent 
upon decreased retirement funds tomorrow. 
B. Masculinities and Transgender Servicemembers 
As outlined above, hegemonic masculinity is defined by its 
opposition to homosexuality.132  It is easy to understand why the 
Trump Administration so emphatically targeted transgender people, 
but masculinities help to explain the urgency of such actions, 
particularly in the context of the military. 
Again, the central principles of hegemonic masculinity are not to 
be a woman and not to be gay.  These two rules often blur together, 
as homophobia is often tied to stereotypes that equate male 
homosexuality with feminine behavior.133 
The vulnerability of men attempting to conform to the mandates 
of hegemonic masculinity magnify this confusion, often in contexts 
that heighten the “danger” of failing to be adequately masculine.  As 
Eve Sedgwick has argued, men are in a double bind: hegemonic 
masculinity tells them not to be gay, but some of the most 
traditionally masculine environments “involve just the sort of close, 
emotionally intense, and frequently physical and sexually charged 
relationships that subject men to the suspicion that they are 
homosexual.”134  For example, the military is a perfect exercise of 
hegemonic masculinity in its literal battles for supremacy and 
traditionally male stereotype, yet it puts men in extremely close 
quarters under intense mental and emotional pressure. 
The background of insecure masculinity helps to explain some of 
the controversy over previous shifts in military policies allowing 
nonwhite people, women, and gay and lesbian servicemembers to 
serve openly.  Opening up a previously homogenous group, 
particularly one that is either exclusively or predominantly male, to 
new members is fraught.135  Men at the top of hegemonic masculinity 
have the furthest to fall and the most to lose if their status as men is 
 
 129. See Rimalt, supra note 69 (“Hence, two decades of a federally guaranteed 
right to a gender-neutral parental leave have not changed traditional 
leave-taking patterns, wherein working women take relatively long leaves for 
parental reasons while men take negligible leaves.”). 
 130. See Bruenig, supra note 11. 
 131. See Eichner, supra note 21, at 1612. 
 132. See supra notes 45–59 and accompanying text. 
 133. See Dowd, supra note 55, at 222. 
 134. Harris, supra note 80, at 787. 
 135. See Cohen, supra note 9, at 527–28 (providing examples of military 
resistance to expanding female combat roles). 
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challenged, so groups of men captured by hegemonic masculinity 
actively police the conformity of their members.136  As David S. Cohen 
explains: 
[M]ales crossing gender boundaries threaten perceptions of 
ingroup cohesiveness and outgroup inferiority; in other words, 
if gender-nonconforming males were accepted by their male 
peer groups, they would call into question the cohesive identity 
of the group of males and risk making women look less inferior.  
When men display negative and dominating attitudes toward 
gender-nonconforming males, they also demonstrate to 
themselves and others that they are not feminine or gay and 
that they are indeed men and masculine.137 
Cynthia Lee and Peter Kwan discuss a similar phenomenon in the 
context of the “trans panic” defense, in which a man argues that his 
murder of or other violence towards a transgender woman was 
provoked by her identity.138  As they explain, the actual (if 
unconscious) motive of such men is fear: fear that others will find out 
that he had sex with a transgender woman and think he is 
homosexual.139  Murdering his transgender sexual partner is a violent 
display of hegemonic masculinity and demonstrates that he is 
disgusted by the idea of sexual activity that others might view as 
gay.140 
Obviously, a man engaging in sexual behavior with a transgender 
woman is not engaged in homosexual behavior: transgender women 
are women.  But this confusion in the minds of such men illustrates 
the root “danger,” as masculinity would view it, with transgender 
people: their challenge to the concept of gender as unchangeable and 
binary.141  For very obvious reasons, hegemonic masculinity depends 
upon a gender binary with very identifiable categories of 
characteristics and behaviors linked to each gender.142  Transgender 
people offer a clear challenge to this worldview.143 
 
 136. See id. at 550. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Cynthia Lee & Peter Kwan, The Trans Panic Defense: Masculinity, 
Heteronormativity, and the Murder of Transgender Women, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 77, 
80 (2014). 
 139. Id. at 109. 
 140. Id. at 110. 
 141. Aaron T. Norton & Gregory M. Herek, Heterosexuals’ Attitudes Toward 
Transgender People: Findings from a National Probability Sample of U.S. Adults, 
68 SEX ROLES 738, 740 (2013). 
 142. See Lee & Kwan, supra note 138, at 109–10. 
 143. Janet Dolgin, Discriminating Gender: Legal, Medical, and Social 
Presumptions About Transgender and Intersex People, 47 SW. L. REV. 61, 74 
(2017). 
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1. Masculinities, the Gender Binary, and Military Service 
Framing claims by transgender people that they have suffered 
discrimination has been a difficult process, largely because there 
remains no constitutional or federal antidiscrimination protection 
that explicitly forbids discrimination on the basis of gender 
identity.144  Instead, advocates have often used sex discrimination 
prohibitions as the operative claim and argued why discrimination 
against transgender people is an extension of other gendered bias.145 
Initial legal claims involving transgender plaintiffs were often 
failures, as opponents to such claims argued that transgender people 
were, in the eyes of the law, whatever sex they were assigned at birth.  
One characteristic example occurred in the Texas case Littleton v. 
Prange.146  The plaintiff, Christie Littleton, was assigned male at 
birth but identified as female from early childhood (she testified 
beginning at age three or four).147  She began searching for a 
physician to perform gender confirmation surgery when she was just 
seventeen years old, and she began undergoing treatment leading to 
confirmation surgery when she was in her twenties.148 
Christie later married John Littleton, and after his death in 1996 
she sought to file a medical malpractice suit against her husband’s 
physician.149  Under Texas state law, Christie was only a proper 
person to file the claim if she were a surviving spouse of the 
decedent.150  The physician filed a motion for summary judgment, 
arguing that Christie was a man, and because Texas did not allow or 
recognize marriages between two people of the same sex, she was not 
a surviving spouse under the wrongful death statute.151 
From the very beginning of the opinion, the court took an 
extremely simplified view of the issues involved.  The decision begins: 
 
 144. See Nicholas Fandos, House Democrats’ Agenda: Ethics, Infrastructure 
and Medical Legislation, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2018/11/07/us/politics/house-democrats-nancy-pelosi.html (discussing potential 
future federal legislation that would explicitly protect against discrimination on 
the basis of gender identity). 
 145. Devi M. Rao, Gender Identity Discrimination Is Sex Discrimination: 
Protection Transgender Students from Bullying and Harassment Using Title IX, 
28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 245, 254–56 (2013). 
 146. 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999). 
 147. Id. at 224. 
 148. Id.  In part because of changes in accepted terms and perhaps in part 
because of the court’s skepticism toward Christie’s claims, the court uses many 
terms that are now considered outdated at best and offensive at worst (one 
example is sex reassignment surgery, now often referred to as gender 
confirmation surgery).  I have changed terms where appropriate in my summary, 
and generally refer to the GLAAD Media Reference Guide as a helpful resource.  
GLADD Media Reference Guide – Transgender, GLAAD, https://www.glaad.org 
/reference/transgender (last visited Feb. 2, 2019). 
 149. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 225. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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This case involves the most basic of questions.  When is a man 
a man, and when is a woman a woman?  Every schoolchild, even 
of tender years, is confident he or she can tell the difference, 
especially if the person is wearing no clothes.  These are 
observations that each of us makes early in life and, in most 
cases, continue to have more than a passing interest in for the 
rest of our lives.  It is one of the more pleasant mysteries.152 
Although the question of the legal recognition of a transgender 
person’s gender identity was one of first impression in Texas at the 
time,153 the court briefly summarized the relatively small number of 
previous cases answering similar questions, including an English 
case from 1970,154 one New York case,155 one Ohio case,156 and one 
case from New Jersey.157  The last case was the only case to have 
found that a marriage between a cisgender male husband and a 
transgender female wife was legally valid.158 
Although the court acknowledged that some jurisdictions allowed 
transgender people to change their birth certificates to conform with 
their gender identity, in the absence of specific action by the Texas 
legislature, the court took an extremely unsympathetic view towards 
Christie’s gender identity, which it referred to abstractly as “fine 
metaphysical arguments lurking about here involving desire and 
being, the essence of life and the power of mind over physics” and “the 
misty fields of sociological philosophy.”159  Ignoring any nuanced 
discussion, the court summarized that Christie’s “female anatomy, 
however, is all man-made.  The body that Christie inhabits is a male 
body in all aspects other than what the physicians have supplied.”160  
The decision finished: 
At the time of birth, Christie was a male, both anatomically and 
genetically.  The facts contained in the original birth certificate 
were true and accurate, and the words contained in the 
amended certificate are not binding on this court. 
There are some things we cannot will into being.  They just 
are.161 
 
 152. Id. at 223–24. 
 153. Id. at 230. 
 154. Id. at 226 (citing Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P 83 (Eng.)). 
 155. Id. at 227 (citing Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1971)). 
 156. Id. at 228 (citing In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987)). 
 157. Id. at 227–28 (citing M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1976)). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 231. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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Such early cases, viewed charitably, simply treated transgender 
people as confused, even if genuinely so.162  Most judges at the time 
considered sex assigned at birth to be immutable.  Characteristic of 
this perspective, the judge in Christie’s case ignored the fact that 
Christie had identified as female since very early childhood and lived 
as John Littleton’s wife for seven years.163  This logic also ignored the 
complications of sex as a binary category, when in fact a range of 
factors create more of a bimodal than a binary distribution even 
before transgender people are considered.164  The Littleton court did 
not explicitly voice many clear expressions of hegemonic 
masculinity—although one notable exception was a wincing reference 
to Christie’s medical treatment as “including a surgery that would 
make most males pale and perspire to contemplate.”165  But the 
absolute rejection of any gray areas in the line between male and 
female (and masculine and feminine) is symptomatic of hegemonic 
masculinity’s dependence upon clear categories. 
Christie Littleton did not raise an explicit antidiscrimination 
claim.166  Later plaintiffs began framing such claims, although not 
with universal success.  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, for example, rejected such a claim in Etsitty v. Utah 
Transit Authority.167  Krystal Etsitty, a transgender woman, worked 
for the Utah Transit Authority as a bus driver.168  When she first 
applied for the job and began working, she used the name given to her 
at birth (Michael) and presented as stereotypically masculine.169  If 
bus drivers needed to use restrooms while they were driving their 
routes, they used public restrooms, so initially Etsitty used male 
restrooms.170  Shortly after she began work, however, she met with a 
supervisor, explained that she was transgender, and notified him that 
she would begin presenting as feminine or female at work.171  After 
she began doing this, she started using female restrooms as needed 
as she drove her routes.172 
A higher-up supervisor at the Transit Authority learned about 
Etsitty and expressed concerns in a meeting with her that, because 
she had not had gender confirmation surgery, a member of the public 
 
 162. See, e.g., id. at 224, 226 (noting how Christie’s “[p]roblems with her 
sexual identity developed early” and how “[i]n her mind, she has corrected her 
physical features to line up with her true gender”). 
 163. Id. at 224, 227. 
 164. See Ilana Gelfman, Because of Intersex: Intersexuality, Title VII, and the 
Reality of Discrimination “Because of . . . [Perceived] Sex”, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 55, 62–63 (2010). 
 165. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231. 
 166. See id. at 225. 
 167. 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 168. Id. at 1218–19. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 1219. 
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might see “a UTA employee with male genitalia . . . using the female 
restroom.”173  After the meeting, Etsitty was placed on administrative 
leave and later fired.174 
Etsitty challenged her termination as gender discrimination 
prohibited by Title VII.175  She offered two theories of how her firing 
violated Title VII: first, she argued that discriminating against a 
transgender person was quite literally discriminating against them 
because of their sex.176  Second, she argued that her employer also 
discriminated against her for failing to conform to stereotypes about 
men, citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.177 
The court swiftly rejected her first argument, quoting the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to say that Title VII’s 
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex means that it is 
“unlawful to discriminate against women because they are women 
and men because they are men.”178  The court concluded that “[i]n 
light of the traditional binary conception of sex, transsexuals may not 
claim protection under Title VII from discrimination based solely on 
their status as a transsexual.”179 
The court’s treatment of Etsitty’s stereotyping claim was slightly 
less simplistic.  The court assumed without deciding that a Price 
Waterhouse-esque theory of stereotyping could present a viable claim 
under the circumstances, and that Etsitty had satisfied her initial 
burden of establishing the claim.180  The court found, however, that 
the Utah Transit Authority had successfully shown a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for firing Etsitty: namely, that she would 
be using a public women’s restrooms as needed while driving her 
routes.181  The court treated bathrooms as simply beyond the bounds 
of gender stereotypes: “However far Price Waterhouse reaches, this 
court cannot conclude it requires employers to allow biological males 
to use women’s restrooms.  Use of a restroom designated for the 
opposite sex does not constitute a mere failure to conform to sex 
stereotypes.”182 
The court’s reasoning betrays several problematic concepts that 
fit in hegemonic masculinity’s worldview.  First, there is the 
description of Etsitty as “biologically male.”183  This appears to refer 
 
 173. Id. 
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 175. Id. at 1219–20. 
 176. Id. at 1221. 
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 178. Id. (quoting Ulane v. E. Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
 179. Id. at 1222. 
 180. Id. at 1224. 
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concern that the use of women’s public restrooms by a biological male could result 
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 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 1226. 
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to the fact that Etsitty had not had gender confirmation surgery, so 
that one of her supervisors explained in a deposition that “there was 
an image issue out there for us, that we could have a problem with 
having someone who, even though his appearance may look female, 
he’s still a male because he still had a penis.”184  As referenced above, 
genetic and biological determinations of gender go far beyond whether 
a person has a penis or not, yet the court found that in context such a 
reductive binary view of sex was not proof of discrimination.185  
Second, there is the conclusory nature of the statement that 
bathrooms are an inappropriate context in which to apply a frame of 
gender stereotypes,186 without any meaningful supporting analysis.  
The use of gender-segregated bathrooms by transgender people 
remains a politically fraught issue, but as a conceptual question it is 
not clear why Etsitty’s entrance into a public bathroom would be an 
issue for the public where her public service as a bus driver would 
not.  One can imagine justifications: a greater concern for privacy is 
one currently raised in debates about bathroom access, for 
example.187  But the court offers no further explanation and takes it 
as self-evident that bathrooms somehow do not implicate gender 
stereotypes, only biological sex.188 
This leads into the third issue with the court’s logic: if gender 
stereotypes were irrelevant to bathroom usage, then Etsitty could 
have alleviated her supervisor’s concern by using public male 
bathrooms.  But obviously that would have been even more 
problematic from her supervisor’s perspective: if the tiny risk that a 
member of the public would see Etsitty’s genitals in a female 
bathroom was enough to justify firing her, certainly an employee who, 
to all external appearances, was a woman walking into a male 
bathroom would be an even larger problem.  The “problem,” in other 
words, was not that Etsitty was using the “wrong” bathroom—it is 
that she was using any bathroom at all, given that her supervisors 
(and the court) saw her as inextricably challenging their narrow idea 
of gender.  Consistent with hegemonic masculinity’s reliance on 
gender as an unchangeable binary, Etsitty could not be allowed to 
change genders, nor could she exist in between genders.  Each person 
must be irreversibly slotted into one of two categories, and anyone 
who challenged the categories themselves must be removed to the 
extent possible from public life.189 
More recent cases take a very different approach to such claims.  
For example, in 2011, Vandiver Elizabeth Glenn, a transgender 
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 185. See id. at 1224; Gelfman, supra note 164, at 55–57. 
 186. See Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1224. 
 187. See Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas J. Molony, Individual Rights, 
Federalism, and the National Battle Over Bathroom Access, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1661, 
1663, 1667 (2017). 
 188. See Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1224. 
 189. See Gelfman, supra note 164, at 56–57. 
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woman, was successful in arguing a gender stereotype claim before 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.190  Glenn 
was hired by the Georgia General Assembly’s Office of Legislative 
Counsel (“OLC”) in 2005, before she began to present her gender 
identity as female.191  The following year, she told her supervisor that 
she was transgender and would begin transitioning her presentation 
of gender identity in the future.192  She subsequently came to work on 
Halloween, when employees could all dress in costume, presenting as 
female.193  Another supervisor told her to leave work and expressed 
prejudicial statements about how “unnatural” and “unsettling” it was 
to “to think of someone dressed in women’s clothing with male sexual 
organs inside that clothing.”194  Several months later, when Glenn 
notified a supervisor that she was changing her legal name and would 
be coming to work presenting as a woman in the future, she was 
fired.195  Glenn later sued her employer for, among other things, sex 
discrimination.196 
The Eleventh Circuit, in contrast to the Etsitty court, found that 
“[a] person is defined as transgender precisely because of the 
perception that his or her behavior transgresses gender 
stereotypes. . . .  There is thus a congruence between discriminating 
against transgender and transsexual individuals and discrimination 
on the basis of gender-based behavioral norms.”197 
In another parallel to Etsitty, because Glenn sued under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than 
Title VII, her employer could have avoided liability if it had an 
exceedingly persuasive reason for its actions.198  Her supervisor 
offered one: the concern that other female employees would object to 
Glenn using a women’s bathroom.199  The court seemed skeptical of 
the supervisor’s very speculative concern even in the abstract, but the 
simple fact that the OLC had only single-occupancy restrooms 
undercut the idea entirely.200 
The Eleventh Circuit’s approach has been much more successful 
in recent years, but transgender legal claims have certainly not been 
universally successful.  Challenges to the Trump Administration’s 
attempted ban of transgender servicemembers, however, have up to 
the point of this Article going to press been extremely successful, 
albeit in early stages of litigation. 
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For example, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia applied heightened scrutiny, reasoning that transgender 
people are at least a quasi-suspect class.201  The court also stated that 
banning transgender servicemembers was a form of gender 
discrimination, because the ban punished transgender people for 
failure to conform to gender stereotypes.202  The court summarized 
very succinctly why transgender people offer such a challenge to 
gender stereotypes: “The defining characteristic of a transgender 
individual is that their inward identity, behavior, and possibly their 
physical characteristics, do not conform to stereotypes of how an 
individual of their assigned sex should feel, act and look.”203 
A later decision in a Maryland district court reached the same 
result, simply citing the D.C. court’s analysis and saying it agreed 
that the ban on transgender servicemembers was discrimination on 
the basis of gender.204  The United States District Court for the 
Central District of California noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals had “strongly suggested that discrimination on the basis of 
one’s transgender status is equivalent to sex-based discrimination,”205 
and in turn approvingly cited the D.C. and Maryland decisions.206  
Going even further, the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Washington agreed with the previous decisions, finding 
that transgender people were in fact a suspect class.207 
After the initial wave of litigation, President Trump directed 
then-Secretary of Defense Mattis to address the issue of transgender 
servicemembers on behalf of the Department of Defense.208  Secretary 
Mattis later presented a memorandum to President Trump in 
February 2018 which ostensibly replaced the early reversal.209  The 
Trump Administration subsequently argued that because the later 
plan “purports not to be a blanket ban on all ‘transgender 
individuals,’” existing lawsuits were mooted.210  Multiple courts 
rejected this logic, noting that the policy had almost exactly the same 
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effect as a blanket ban of transgender servicemembers.211  As the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia stated:  
[T]he Mattis Implementation Plan has not mooted Plaintiffs’ 
claims because that plan is not a “new policy” that is 
meaningfully distinct from the President’s 2017 directives that 
were originally challenged in this case.  Instead, at a 
fundamental level, the Mattis Implementation Plan is just 
that—a plan that implements the President’s directive that 
transgender people be excluded from the military.212 
Despite the success of cases thus far, it seems likely that the Trump 
Administration will continue to defend the ban of transgender 
servicemembers and, given the replacement of Justice Anthony 
Kennedy with Justice Brett Kavanaugh,213 the Supreme Court will 
likely be significantly less sympathetic to LGBTQ plaintiffs and 
antidiscrimination claims.  In what may be an early signal of the 
Court’s future decisions, in January 2019 the Court lifted two 
injunctions of the transgender servicemember ban, allowing the 
military to begin implementing the ban as litigation challenging the 
policy continued in lower courts.214  Additionally, the Trump 
Administration has reversed previous agency positions as to a variety 
of antidiscrimination protections, including Title VII215 and Title 
IX,216 making clear that this is a far-reaching strategy to reject 
characterization of gender stereotyping as a form of sex 
discrimination. 
Looking at the Trump Administration’s actions through the lens 
of masculinities studies, it is clear that a major reason for the absolute 
hostility to transgender Americans is rooted in hegemonic 
masculinity.  To admit that transgender people face similar issues of 
gender discrimination as Ann Hopkins did at Price Waterhouse is to 
acknowledge that any deviation from the extreme norms of hegemonic 
masculinity is merely one step down a path that challenges the very 
concept of gender as binary.  Further, transgender people serving in 
the military bring that challenge into the heart of an activity and 
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culture that hegemonic masculinity sees as uniquely and inherently 
masculine, characterized by hierarchy, competition, and violence.217  
It is easy to understand, in other words, why an administration 
captured by the values of hegemonic masculinity would perceive 
transgender servicemembers as such a threat and take such sudden 
and public actions ejecting transgender soldiers from the military and 
preventing any more from enlisting. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Trump Administration’s actions supporting paid parental 
leave and opposing service of transgender people in the military are 
not two warring impulses or conflicting ideological moves.  They are 
consistent with a single ideology, that of hegemonic masculinity.  The 
obvious next question is whether that presents advocates with any 
clear strategies for combating hegemonic masculinity in general, and 
these policies in particular. 
In a political sense, one of the key insights of masculinities 
studies is to recognize that although patriarchal systems oppress 
anyone who is not a man, hegemonic masculinity also oppresses men.  
Even men at the hypothetical top of the hegemonic masculinity food 
chain are vulnerable in the sense that their achievement is 
perpetually in jeopardy, one that demands that masculinity be 
performed over and over to prevent other men from overtaking them.  
For the vast majority of men, moreover, the strictures of hegemonic 
masculinity are alienating and punitive.  Greater recognition of the 
shared experiences of victimization by hegemonic masculinity and its 
values brings more people together in opposition.  For example, 
during the hearings about Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s nomination to 
the Supreme Court, after multiple allegations of sexual assault arose 
from his years in high school and college, many commentators tried 
to dismiss the allegations because “boys will be boys.”218  The vast 
majority of teenage boys never sexually assault anyone, and it is 
profoundly insulting to those people to imply that they did.  Calling 
out examples of hegemonic masculinity and universalizing what is 
not universal behavior places more people, including men, on the side 
of questioning hegemonic masculinity’s assumptions about the world, 
and, one hopes, questioning how those assumptions play into policy. 
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In the legal context, focusing on shared vulnerability suggests a 
revitalization of a famous strategy employed by Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg in her own years as an activist.  Justice Ginsburg used men 
as plaintiffs in several landmark cases challenging gender 
discrimination: although the individual claims being vindicated 
benefited men, the principles of gender equality benefited all 
genders.219  Particularly given the Trump Administration’s success 
filling judicial vacancies in all levels of the federal courts, the pace of 
legal evolution toward a just understanding of gender is likely to slow, 
if not reverse.  Trump-appointed judges are likely to be far less 
sympathetic to female and LGBTQ plaintiffs.  They may, however, be 
more sympathetic to plaintiffs presenting cases of shared 
vulnerability, where the legal implementation of hegemonic 
masculinity hurts someone who looks like them (overwhelmingly 
male and white). 
This emphasis on the universal harm of hegemonic masculinity 
will not work universally, and if the recent resurgence of reactionary 
political forces subsides, it may not be necessary as a political or legal 
strategy in the long term.  The Trump presidency, however, has 
developed into an undeniable example of how much damage 
hegemonic masculinity inflicts when it captures powerful 
institutions.  However, the Trump brand of hegemonic masculinity is 
defeated, it will stand as a warning for generations to come. 
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